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INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to resolve the issues of whether 
states can limit marriage to between one man and one woman, and whether states must recognize 
same-sex marriages validly created in other states. 1  The Court has already struck as 
unconstitutional the Defense of Marriage Acts’ federal definition of marriage as between one 
man and one woman in United States v. Windsor.2 Dissenting in that opinion, Justice Scalia 
fatefully pronounced that he was waiting for the other shoe to drop—that is, that he believes the 
Court’s language has already laid the groundwork for the downfall of the ability of states 
individually to define marriage as between one man and one woman.3 However, Windsor and 
other Supreme Court precedents do not necessarily compel the conclusion that states must permit 
the solemnization of same-sex marriages. Nor do those precedents necessarily compel the 
conclusion that states must recognize such marriages that have been validly created in other 
states.      
Part I of this Note focuses on the implications of the Court’s recognition of marriage as a 
fundamental right in Loving v. Virginia. 4  That Part argues that, although marriage is a 
fundamental right, same-sex marriage does not fall within that definition. Therefore, state laws 
limiting marriage to between one man and one woman should not be subject to  strict scrutiny as 
a matter of substantive due process. Rather, they must only be rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest in order to be constitutional.5  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, No. 14-571, 2015 WL 213650 (U.S. 2015). 
2 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
3 Id. at 2709-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
4 See infra Part I.  
5 For purposes of this Note, I am assuming that the Supreme Court will not treat sexual orientation as a protected 
class under a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause analysis. If the Supreme Court found sexual 
orientation to be a suspect class, then it would apply either strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny, which opponents 
of same-sex marriage would be highly unlikely to overcome.  
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Part II explores the arguments that proponents of same-sex marriage have made based on 
Lawrence v. Texas, which struck same-sex sodomy laws as unconstitutional.6 That Part explains 
that the Court’s decision was founded on its view of the impermissibility of the state invading the 
privacy of one’s bedroom and criminalizing intimate conduct in which consenting adults engage 
in that particular context. It argues that, since the Lawrence Court was concerned exclusively 
about individual privacy, the precedent does not govern a state’s public action of permitting or 
recognizing—or refusing to permit or recognize—same-sex marriage. 
 Part III analyzes the reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Windsor.7 It argues that the federalism implications of the federal government’s attempt to define 
marriage in DOMA have little bearing on the ability of states individually to continue to define 
marriage. Further, although the federal government may have interfered with the equal dignity 
that a state had conferred on a same-sex marriage, it would work an equal affront to the dignity 
of other states if they were forced to permit and recognize marriage as defined by the state with 
the broadest definition of marriage. Therefore, Windsor does not compel states to permit or 
recognize same-sex marriages.  
 Part IV concludes with a proposal regarding how states can survive rational-basis review 
when their laws refuse to permit or recognize same-sex marriage.8 After providing an overview 
of rational-basis review, it provides examples of legitimate government interests to which 
marriage laws are rationally related. Since laws refusing to permit or recognize same-sex 
marriage can survive rational-basis review, and existing precedent does not compel states to 
permit or recognize same-sex marriage, it is constitutional for states to limit marriage to between 
one man and one woman.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See infra Part II. 
7 See infra Part III. 
8 See infra Part IV. 
	   	  3 
I. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF MARRIAGE: WHAT STATE LIMITATIONS ARE PERMISSIBLE AFTER 
LOVING? 
States have defined marriage in the past with a variety of limitations. For instance, they 
have limited marriage based on age,9 degree of kinship,10 number of spouses,11 race,12 and 
gender.13 While few have qualms with the state limiting the ability of a twelve-year-old or of two 
siblings to marry, limitations based on race are undeniably unconstitutional.14 The question, then, 
is whether a limitation based on gender—marriage as only between one man and one woman—is 
similarly unconstitutional or is a permissible limitation. In order to determine this, it is essential 
to examine the Supreme Court’s precedent of Loving v. Virginia,15 where the Court clearly stated 
that marriage is a fundamental right,16 and explore the implications of that decision.17       
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 551.51 (2014) (“A marriage in this state shall not be contracted by a person who is 
under 16 years of age, and the marriage, if entered into, shall be void.”). 
10 See, e.g., § 551.3 (“A man shall not marry his mother, sister, grandmother, daughter, granddaughter, stepmother, 
grandfather’s wife, son’s wife, grandson’s wife, wife’s mother, wife’s grandmother, wife’s daughter, wife’s 
granddaughter, brother’s daughter, sister’s daughter, father’s sister, mother’s sister, or cousin of the first degree, or 
another man.”); § 551.4 (“A woman shall not marry her father, brother, grandfather, son, grandson, stepfather, 
grandmother’s husband, daughter’s husband, granddaughter’s husband, husband’s father, husband’s grandfather, 
husband’s son, husband’s grandson, brother’s son, sister’s son, father’s brother, mother’s brother, or cousin of the 
first degree, or another woman.”). 
11 See, e.g., § 551.5 (“No marriage shall be contracted whilst either of the parties has a former wife or husband 
living, unless the marriage of such former wife or husband, shall have been dissolved.”). 
12 See, e.g., Cyrus E. Phillips IV, Miscegenation: The Courts and the Constitution, 8 WM. & MARY L. REV. 133, 
133-34 (1966) (noting which states had anti-miscegenation statutes still in effect in 1966 and which states had 
already repealed their anti-miscegenation statutes).  
13 See, e.g., § 551.1-2 (“Marriage is inherently a unique relationship between a man and a woman. As a matter of 
public policy, this state has a special interest in encouraging, supporting, and protecting that unique relationship in 
order to promote, among other goals, the stability and welfare of society and its children. A marriage contracted 
between individuals of the same sex is invalid in this state.”).  
14 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (explaining that the “statutory scheme adopted by the State of Virginia to 
prevent marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial classification violates the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
15 See infra Section I.A (providing an overview of Loving). 
16 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. As the Supreme Court has elsewhere explained in the substantive due process clause 
context, a “fundamental right” is something that is “objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition.’” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 
115, 125 (1992)). 
17 See infra Section I.B (examining arguments on both sides of the issue of whether same-sex marriage is a 
fundamental right and exploring the implications of Loving’s language). 
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A. Overview of Loving 
In Loving, the Court determined that state laws limiting marriage based only on race 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment.18 The Virginia laws at issue voided marriages between 
whites and persons of color.19 Further, the laws made it a crime for a whites and persons of color 
to leave Virginia for the purpose of marrying in another state and before returning to Virginia to 
cohabit as husband and wife. 20  The United States Supreme Court struck these laws as 
unconstitutional, reversing Virginia’s Supreme Court of Appeals, rejecting Virginia’s equal 
protection argument, and declaring that marriage is a fundamental right.21 
Virginia’s Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the laws at issue because they served a 
supposedly legitimate purpose of preventing the creation of “‘a mongrel breed of citizens.’”22 
Further, the court “reasoned that marriage has traditionally been subject to state regulation 
without federal intervention.”23 However, the United States Supreme Court found that, despite 
this tradition, such invidious racial discrimination for the purpose of advancing White 
Supremacy was unconstitutional.24 
Before the United States Supreme Court, Virginia argued that its laws do not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause because they punish whites and colored people in the same way.25 
Hence, although the laws classify persons based on race, they do not invidiously discriminate 
based on race and, therefore, heightened scrutiny did not apply.26 Virginia further argued that, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.  
19 Id. at 4-5. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 2, 12. 
22 Id. at 7 (quoting Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (1955)).   
23 Id. (citing Naim, 87 S.E.2d at 756).  
24 Id. at 11. 
25 Id. at 8.  
26 See id. 
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because it was not clear what impact interracial marriages would have, the Court should defer to 
the legislature’s decision under rational-basis review.27  
The Supreme Court first rejected Virginia’s equal-protection argument.28 The Court 
stated that a law’s equal application does not alone “immunize the statute from the very heavy 
burden of justification which the Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of state 
statutes drawn according to race.”29 The Court pointed out that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
“clear and central purpose . . . was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial 
discrimination in the States.”30 As such, laws that classify based on race must be necessary to a 
permissible State goal other than racial discrimination in order to survive constitutional 
challenge.31 The Court found that the law’s only goal was to advance White Supremacy, which is 
not a permissible state goal—let alone a compelling one.32 Therefore, the Court found that 
“restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central 
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.”33  
The Supreme Court further found that these laws violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause.34  The Court explained that “[t]he freedom to marry has long been 
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free 
men.”35 Further, marriage is a basic civil right that is “fundamental to our very existence and 
survival.”36 Therefore, the Court concluded that “[t]o deny this fundamental freedom on so 
unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 11.  
29 Id. at 9. 
30 Id. at 10.  
31 Id. at 11.  
32 See id.  
33 Id. at 12. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
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directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is 
surely to deprive . . . citizens of liberty without due process of law.”37    
B. Implications of Loving for Same-Sex Marriage 
Many people hold Loving up as an example of the fundamental right to marry, claiming 
that same-sex marriage falls under this category.38 However, others counter that the right to 
marry is limited to marriage between a man and a woman, as that is the most natural reading of 
the language and context of Loving.39 Marriage is, indeed, a fundamental right that should be 
vigilantly protected.40 However, the Court in Loving did not establish an absolute bar to states 
that impose limits on marriage.41 
1. Arguments that Same-Sex Marriage Is a Fundamental Right 
Many courts42 and scholars43 argue that same-sex marriage is included within marriage, 
which Loving established as a fundamental right. Therefore, they argue, state laws cannot 
infringe on the fundamental right of same-sex marriage unless they survive strict scrutiny.44 
Strict scrutiny requires that the law be necessary, or narrowly tailored, to achieve a compelling 
government interest.45 Under this analysis, the law is presumed unconstitutional and the state has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Id. 
38 See infra Subsection I.B.1 (discussing arguments that same-sex marriage is a fundamental right). 
39 See infra Subsection I.B.2. 
40 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
41 See id. 
42 See, e.g., Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 373 (4th Cir. 2014); Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1081 (10th Cir. 
2014) (holding that “Oklahoma’s ban on same-sex marriage sweeps too broadly in that it denies a fundamental right 
to all same-sex couples who seek to marry or have their marriages recognized”); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 
1199 (10th Cir. 2014) (“We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right to marry, establish a 
family, raise children, and enjoy the full protection of a state’s marital laws. A state may not deny the issuance of a 
marriage license to two persons, or refuse to recognize their marriage, based solely upon the sex of the persons in 
the marriage union.”). 
43 See, e.g., Nancy C. Marcus, Deeply Rooted Principles of Equal Liberty, Not “Argle Bargle”: The Inevitability of 
Marriage Equality After Windsor, 23 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 17, 22 (2014). 
44 Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d at 377. 
45 Id. at 378. 
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the burden of proof to establish the law’s constitutionality.46 If the Supreme Court ultimately 
agrees and finds that same-sex marriage is included within the concept of the fundamental right 
of marriage, then states have virtually no chance of proving that their laws limiting marriage to 
between one man and one woman are constitutional.47  
For instance, last year, the Fourth Circuit held that same-sex marriage is included in the 
idea of marriage being a fundamental right.48 In that case, Virginia’s law refusing to recognize 
same-sex marriage was challenged.49 The Fourth Circuit cited Loving when it explained its view 
that “the Supreme Court has demonstrated that the right to marry is an expansive liberty interest 
that may stretch to accommodate changing societal norms.”50 The court reasoned that the 
fundamental right of marriage was not narrowly construed in Loving to just a question of “‘the 
right to interracial marriage,’” but instead was seen as “a broad right to marry that is not 
circumscribed based on the characteristics of individuals seeking to exercise that right.”51 Hence, 
the court argued, people have a real choice of who they will marry, not an illusory one limited 
only “to certain couplings.”52 Having concluded that same-sex marriage is a fundamental right, 
the Fourth Circuit naturally found that Virginia’s law significantly interfered with that right.53 
Therefore, the court applied strict scrutiny and struck Virginia’s law as unconstitutional.54  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 See id. 
47 Because of this, I do not spend time in this Note discussing arguments for or against surviving strict scrutiny 
under the substantive Due Process Clause.   
48 Id. at 373. 
49 Id. at 367. 
50 Id. at 376. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 377. 
53 Id. (“Of course, ‘[b]y reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry, we do not mean to suggest that 
every state regulation which relates in any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriages must be subjected to 
rigorous scrutiny.’ Strict scrutiny only applies when laws ‘significantly interfere’ with a fundamental right.” 
(citation omitted) (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 347, 386 (1978)). 
54 Id. (“Under strict scrutiny, a law ‘may be justified only by compelling state interests, and must be narrowly drawn 
to express only those interests.’” (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977))). 
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Similarly, one scholar, Nancy Marcus, has argued that same-sex marriage is a 
fundamental right.55 She maintained that “Loving will ultimately be a difficult case for same-sex 
marriage opponents to distinguish.”56 Marcus maintained that the stage has been set “for a future 
marriage equality determination” because in Windsor, the Court cited Loving to “emphasiz[e] the 
primacy of fundamental individual marriage rights over discriminatory state and federal laws.”57 
However, based on this generalization of Loving and Windsor, she largely assumed that Loving is 
hard to distinguish from same-sex marriage without providing any analysis in support of that 
conclusion.   
2. Arguments that Same-Sex Marriage Is Not a Fundamental Right 
In contrast, some courts58 and scholars argue that, although marriage is a fundamental 
right, history and tradition limit that right to marriages between one man and one woman. 
Further, others point out that Loving’s support of interracial marriages does not necessarily carry 
over into the context of same-sex marriages.59 Together, these arguments demonstrate that same-
sex marriage is not a fundamental right.  
Although some argue that marriage as a fundamental right should not be narrowly 
defined to exclude same-sex marriage, the Court has previously defined recognized categories of 
fundamental rights narrowly. For example, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of 
Health, the Court found “that the Due Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as an 
interest in refusing life-sustaining medical treatment.”60 Leaning on Cruzan, in Washington v. 
Glucksberg, proponents of assisted suicide argued that this fundamental right should be broadly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 See Marcus, supra note 43, at 22.  
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 See, e.g., DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 411 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, No. 14-571, 2015 WL 213650 (U.S. 
2015). 
59 See, e.g., Murray Dry, The Same-Sex Marriage Controversy and American Constitutionalism: Lessons Regarding 
Federalism, The Separation of Powers, and Individual Rights, 39 Vt. L. Rev. 275, 298 (2014). 
60 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990).  
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construed as either a right to decide how and when to die or a right to dignity in death.61 
However, the Court rejected this broad definition and instead narrowly considered if the right to 
suicide, and the accompanying right to assisted suicide, is rooted in our nations’ history and 
tradition.62 Using this more narrow definition of the proposed right, the Court found that the right 
to suicide is not rooted in our nation’s history; therefore, there is no fundamental right to assisted 
suicide.63 Moreover, the Court noted that the fact “[t]hat many of the rights and liberties 
protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping 
conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected.”64 
In a similar analysis, the Sixth Circuit recently found that same-sex marriage is not within 
the fundamental right to marry.65 Much like the Court in Glucksberg, the Sixth Circuit explained 
“that something can be fundamentally important without being a fundamental right under the 
Constitution.”66 In order to rank as a constitutionally fundamental right, “the question is whether 
our nation has treated the right as fundamental and therefore worthy of protection under 
substantive due process.”67 In other words, the court must analyze “whether the right is ‘deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such 
that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’”68 Although the Court in 
Loving recognized that marriage is a fundamental right, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that, by 
definition, same-sex marriage was not included in that concept.69 Rather, the Court in Loving 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 728. 
64 Id. at 727 (citation omitted). 
65 DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 411 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, No. 14-571, 2015 WL 213650 (U.S. 2015). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). 
69 Id. 
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was focused on the unconstitutional prohibition of interracial marriages between opposite sex 
couples.70 Therefore, Loving does not support a fundamental right to same-sex marriage.71 
Additionally, one scholar, Murray Dry, has pointed out that proponents of same-sex 
marriage hold out Loving’s rejection of racial limitations in marriage as a shining example of 
why same-sex marriages must be recognized.72 However, that scholar noted that this “analogy 
between race and sexual orientation . . . presupposes that a republican, or representative, 
government has no more reason to take the natural difference between male and female into 
account when enacting laws regarding marriage than it does to take race or color into account.”73 
He argued that, because “procreation depends on the division of labor between male and female 
and has nothing to do with racial difference or similarity, it should not be assumed that a right to 
racially mixed marriages implies a right to same-sex marriages.”74 As this scholar concluded, 
when the Court was discussing marriage as a fundamental right in Loving, “the Court viewed 
marriage as the union of a man and a woman.”75 
3. Conclusions from Loving’s Language  
Having surveyed arguments on each side of this debate, the ultimate focus ought to be on 
the language of Loving itself. The Loving Court stated that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment 
requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. 
Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry, a person of another race resides with 
the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”76 Therefore, even in its substantive due 
process analysis, the Loving Court focused on not limiting marriage based on invidious racial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Id. 
71 See id. 
72 Dry, supra note 59, at 298. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 336. 
76 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (emphasis added). 
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classifications.77 This is much different than saying that Loving supports a fundamental right of 
marriage that a state cannot curtail for any reason. Hence, the language of Loving itself is much 
more limited than many proponents of same-sex marriage have claimed.78  
Again, the Court did not say that a person has the unlimited freedom to marry any other 
person he or she chooses.79 Rather, the Court said that people have the unlimited freedom to 
marry “a person of another race.”80 While by analogy this could support the freedom to marry 
someone of the same gender, Loving is not necessarily that expansive.81 Indeed, one can soundly 
argue that the Loving Court presupposed that one of the essential attributes of marriage is its 
being between a man and a woman, much like the essential marriage requirements of consent or 
marrying only one person at a time.82 In contrast, a non-essential marriage requirement is that the 
man and woman be of the same race. Therefore, while the state may not impose racial 
restrictions on marriage, it may impose limits based on gender, consent, and number of spouses. 
Indeed, at the time the Court decided Loving, it likely did not even conceive of the “one man and 
one woman” requirement as a limitation, but was instead just a natural aspect of marriage itself.83   
Therefore, although the choice of whom to marry is a deeply personal decision, it is not a 
fundamental right. As the Court explained in Glucksburg, “That many of the rights and liberties 
protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping 
conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected.”84 Since 
same-sex marriage is not deeply rooted in America’s history and tradition, it does not fall within 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 See id. 
78 See Dry, supra note 59, at 298. 
79 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
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81 See Dry, supra note 59, at 298. 
82 Id. at 336 (arguing that when the Court was discussing marriage as a fundamental right in Loving, “the Court 
viewed marriage as the union of a man and a woman); see also DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 411-12 (6th Cir. 
2014), cert. granted, No. 14-571, 2015 WL 213650 (U.S. 2015). 
83 See DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 411. 
84 Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997) (citation omitted). 
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the fundamental right of marriage. Hence, the heightened scrutiny that accompanies fundamental 
rights does not apply to prohibitions against same-sex marriages. Instead, laws limiting marriage 
to between one man and one woman are constitutional if they “rationally advance a legitimate 
government policy.”85 Whether such state laws can survive rational basis is further addressed in 
Part IV.86  
II. PRIVATE ACTION V. PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: IS THE STATE BOUND BY PERSONAL 
AUTONOMY IN MARRIAGE DECISIONS AFTER LAWRENCE? 
Another common argument for same-sex marriage is based on Lawrence v. Texas, in 
which the Court struck same-sex sodomy laws as unconstitutional.87 Some have argued that the 
state should not be allowed to invade people’s decisions on whom to marry.88 However, others 
point out that Lawrence alone does not compel the conclusion that states must permit same-sex 
marriage.89 Before examining these arguments, it is important to first examine the Court’s 
reasoning and holding in Lawrence. 90 Only with this background in mind can one fully 
appreciate the implications of Lawrence for the same-sex marriage debate, and understand why 
Lawrence does not require states to permit same-sex marriage.91  
A. Overview of Lawrence 
In Lawrence, the Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick in holding that Texas’ statute 
criminalizing homosexual sodomy was unconstitutional.92 The Court started its opinion by 
explaining,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 404. 
86 See infra Part IV. 
87 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
88 See infra Subsection II.B.1. 
89 See infra Subsection II.B.2. 
90 See infra Section II.A. 
91 See infra Subsection II.B.3. 
92 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562, 578.  
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Liberty protects the person from unwanted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private 
places. In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our 
lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant presence. 
Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes 
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves 
liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions.93 
The Texas law at issue criminalized having “‘deviate sexual intercourse . . . with a member of 
the same sex.’”94 The Court considered the question of whether consenting adults could “engage 
in [this] private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”95 As a backdrop to its reconsideration of Bowers v. Hardwick, the 
Court provided an overview of cases that addressed various liberties under substantive due 
process.96  
 First, the Court discussed its past cases considering the right to privacy in utilizing 
contraceptives.97 In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court held that states cannot constitutionally 
prohibit married couples from buying and using contraceptives.98 Emphasizing “the marital 
relation and the protected space of the marital bedroom,” the Court found that there was a 
“protected interest” in “a right to privacy.”99 Several years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court 
extended “the right to make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct” to unmarried couples.100 
In Eisenstadt, the Court ruled a state law unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause 
because it prevented the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried couples.101 However, the 
Court also mentioned that the law interfered with fundamental rights, stating, “‘If the right of 
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Id. at 562. 
94 Id. at 563 (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2003)). 
95 Id. at 564. 
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98 Id. at 564-65 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)). 
99 Id. (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485). 
100 Id. at 565 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972)). 
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unwanted government intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child.’”102 Therefore, laws interfering with the private decisions of 
individuals to use contraceptives were held unconstitutional.103  
 Second, the Court turned to its decision in Roe v. Wade, which limited the ability of states 
to enact laws prohibiting or regulating abortions.104 The Court found that a woman’s right to 
choose abortion was “protect[ed] as an exercise of her liberty under the Due Process Clause.” 
The Court “recognized the right of a woman to make certain fundamental decisions affecting her 
destiny” and further affirmed “that the protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause has a 
substantive dimension of fundamental significance in defining the rights of the person.”105  
 Finally, the Court reconsidered its decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, where the Court had 
previously upheld a Georgia law that prohibited both homosexual and heterosexual sodomy.106 
In Bowers, the Court defined the issue as “‘whether the Federal Constitution confers a 
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.’”107 In reconsidering Bowers, the 
Lawrence Court explained that this narrow definition of the issue “failed to appreciated the 
extent of the liberty at stake” because the statutes “touch[ed] upon the most private human 
conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home” and also sought “to 
control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is 
within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.”108 Having thus 
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105 Id. (citing Roe, 410 U.S. 113). 
106 Id. at 566 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)). 
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broadened the issue, the Lawrence Court concluded that consenting adults can, in the privacy of 
their homes, choose to engage in homosexual, intimate conduct.109    
 Since the Court more broadly defined the liberty at stake, the Court also found that 
history and tradition did not support the ability of the states to limit consensual homosexual 
conduct.110 The Court focused on the history of prohibitions against all sodomy, whether 
homosexual or heterosexual.111 Further, the Court noted that these laws typically were not 
enforced against adults who consented to the acts and performed them in private.112 Rather, the 
Court claimed that the purpose of anti-sodomy laws was to prevent “predatory acts” in situations 
where a minor or an assault victim did not give consent.113 Finally, the Court explained that an 
“emerging awareness” in America’s “laws and traditions” illustrated “that liberty gives 
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters 
pertaining to sex.”114 
 Next, the Court turned to its holdings after Bowers. In Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,115 the Court held that, as a matter of substantive due 
process, “our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to 
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.”116 
Further, in Romer v. Evans, the Court struck as unconstitutional a law that deprived homosexuals 
of the protection of antidiscrimination laws in the state.117 The Court found that this law was the 
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114 Id. at 571-72. 
115 Id. at 573 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)). 
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product of animus against homosexuals, and thus was not rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest.118     
 After surveying all of this precedent, the Court returned to the Texas law at issue in 
Lawrence.119 The Court focused on the stigma imposed by a statute that criminalizes homosexual 
conduct.120 Those who engage in homosexual conduct could incur criminal records and be placed 
on sex-offender registration lists.121 As a result, they could have a more difficult time obtaining 
employment.122 Finally, the Court noted that this was not a case involving minors, coercion, 
public conduct, or prostitution.123 Rather, it was a case involving adults engaged in consensual 
homosexual conduct.124 Since those adults were “entitled to respect for their private lives,” the 
state could not “demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual 
conduct a crime.”125 Therefore, the Court overruled Bowers because, under the Due Process 
Clause, people are free to participate in this conduct without government intervention.126    
B. Implications of Lawrence for Same-Sex Marriage  
 Many people argue that Lawrence’s protection of the right to engage in consensual 
homosexual conduct clearly supports a corresponding right to same-sex marriage.127 However, 
others counter that Lawrence was limited to sexual intimacy and does not extend to the marriage 
context.128 Overall, the language of Lawrence illustrates that the Court was concerned about 
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protecting private sexual conduct, which does not necessarily demand a corresponding protection 
for the public act of marriage.129  
1. Arguments for Allowing and Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage 
Some scholars130 and courts131 have argued that Lawrence supports a constitutional right 
to same-sex marriage. They often consider the language of Lawrence addressing autonomy in 
personal decisions.132 In doing so, they conclude that same-sex marriage is included within the 
fundamental right to marry.133   
For example, one scholar, Nancy Marcus, argued that the right to same-sex marriage 
involves “a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.”134 Marcus focused 
on Lawrence’s language that, like heterosexual persons, “‘persons in a homosexual relationship 
may seek autonomy for [the] purposes’” of “‘freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain 
intimate conduct.’”135 From this, Marcus concluded that Lawrence and other Supreme Court 
precedent affirm that “the right to marry the person of one’s choice [is] a fundamental right.”136  
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit also focused on Lawrence’s language in finding that same-
sex marriage is a constitutionally protected right.137 The Fourth Circuit looked to Lawrence’s 
language that the Due Process Clause “‘afford[s] constitutional protection to personal decisions 
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and 
education. . . . Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just 
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as heterosexual persons do.’”138 Since the Lawrence Court would not narrowly define the issue 
to the right to engage in homosexual sodomy, the Fourth Circuit similarly would not narrowly 
define its issue to the right to same-sex marriage.139 Rather, in defining the issue more broadly, 
the Fourth Circuit found “that the fundamental right to marry encompasses the right to same-sex 
marriage.”140 The Fourth Circuit described this broad issue as, at the heart, involving “a matter of 
choice” in “personal relationships.”141 
2. Arguments Against Allowing and Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage  
In contrast, other scholars and courts have argued that Lawrence does not necessarily 
support a constitutional right to same-sex marriage. While Lawrence assists same-sex marriage 
proponents in some ways, its language clearly does not require states to permit same-sex 
marriages. 
Although some scholars have reasoned that Lawrence may provide support for same-sex 
marriage, they also concede that Lawrence alone does not compel the conclusion that states must 
permit same-sex marriages.142 For instance, Murray Dry categorized Lawrence as a case that 
could lend support to same-sex marriage.143 However, he ultimately pointed to Lawrence’s 
language explaining that the case did “‘not involve whether the government must give formal 
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.’”144 Similarly, Carlos Ball 
noted that the Lawrence Court “distinguished between the ability of the state, consistent with the 
Constitution, to criminalize same-gender sexual conduct, and the obligation of the state to 
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recognize same-sex relationships.”145 Ball argued that, while Lawrence is relevant to the same-
sex marriage debate, it is not dispositive.146 For example, Lawrence is relevant to this debate 
because, if states could criminalize homosexual conduct, it would make little sense to say that 
states must permit homosexual marriage.147 Although Lawrence removed this barrier, Ball 
acknowledged that Lawrence alone does not necessarily compel the conclusion that states must 
permit same-sex marriages.148     
Likewise, in DeBoer v. Snyder, the Sixth Circuit noted that Lawrence itself only 
“invalidates a State’s criminal antisodomy law and . . . ‘does not involve . . . formal recognition’ 
of same-sex relationships.”149 However, the Sixth Circuit went further in contrasting the situation 
in Lawrence with the same-sex marriage debate.150 Specifically, the Sixth Circuit contrasted the 
state of America’s social values and the European Court of Human Rights at the time of 
Lawrence and DeBoer.  
First, the Sixth Circuit addressed society’s values as measured by the number of states 
criminalizing sodomy or prohibiting same-sex marriage.151 The Lawrence Court’s analysis was 
informed by the fact that only thirteen states at that time still prohibited sodomy, and those states 
rarely enforced their anti-sodomy laws.152 In contrast, at the time of the Sixth Circuit’s decision 
in DeBoer, “[f]reed from federal-court intervention, thirty-one states would continue to define 	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marriage the old-fashioned way.”153 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that society’s values 
have not changed in relation to same-sex marriage in the same way that they had changed in 
relation to sodomy. 154  Hence, society’s values have not yet changed enough or become 
sufficiently settled to justify interfering with states’ definitions of marriage.155 
Second, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court has occasionally 
considered foreign practice “when deciding to expand the meaning of constitutional 
guarantees.”156 For instance, the Lawrence Court looked to a European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) decision, along with actions of other nations, which affirmed that “the protected right of 
homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct” was “an integral part of human 
freedom in many other countries.”157 Hence, the Lawrence Court’s decision accorded with the 
“values we share[d] with a wider civilization.”158 Regarding same-sex marriage, however, “the 
[ECHR] ruled only a few years ago that European human rights laws do not guarantee a right to 
same-sex marriage.”159 Further, the ECHR determined that, since the law is still evolving on 
whether same-sex marriage is a human right, the individual states retain wide discretion about 
when to introduce changes legislatively.160 Since the Laurence Court utilized precedent from the 
ECHR in striking anti-sodomy laws, the Court should similarly be informed by the ECHR in the 
context of same-sex marriage. Just as the ECHR declined to declare a European human right to 
same-sex marriage, thereby permitting individual nations to adopt or refuse the institution, the 
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Supreme Court ought not declare a constitutional right to same-sex marriage, thereby permitting 
individual states to adopt or refuse the institution.161 
3. Conclusions from Lawrence’s Language  
As proponents and opponents of same-sex marriage have shown in the arguments 
expressed above, the Lawrence Court offered language that lends support to each side of the 
debate. However, rather than utilizing a scalpel to extract only the most favorable language for a 
particular side, it is important to return to the overview of how Lawrence was decided and the 
totality of the language used. It then becomes clear that Lawrence does not compel a right to 
same-sex marriage. 
At the beginning of Lawrence, the Court found that consenting adults enjoy the liberty to 
engage in sexual conduct because liberty under the Due Process Clause protects individuals from 
the government intrusion into homes and other private contexts.162 The recurring references to 
“private conduct” and “private places” imply that the Court was focused solely on preventing 
state interference in private places.163 However, the Court went further, explaining that liberty 
transcends private places because it “presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of 
thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”164 Proponents of same-sex marriage 
seize upon this language about autonomy and extend it to the marriage context.165 However, as 
the rest of the case shows, they act too hastily in so concluding.  
The Court next moved to its precedent addressing the right to privacy. First, this right 
operated as an umbrella over the right of both married and unmarried couples to buy and use 
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contraceptives.166 The Court found a “right to make decisions regarding sexual conduct” because 
the right to privacy encompasses the right “‘to be free from unwanted government intrusion into 
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.’”167 
Second, this concept naturally flowed into the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade that a woman has 
a right to choose abortion because it is a “fundamental decision[] affecting her destiny.”168 
However, each of these cases dealt specifically with reproductive rights, involving inherently 
private decisions.  
Similarly, when the Lawrence Court overruled Bowers, it found that the statute at issue 
“touch[ed] upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of 
places, the home” and also sought “to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled 
to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being 
punished as criminals.”169 Further expounding on this point, the Court indicated “that liberty 
gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in 
matters pertaining to sex.”170 Hence, as the Court mentioned at the beginning of its opinion, 
people have a right to autonomy in their decisions about private, intimate conduct.171  
While choices about whether to marry and whom to marry are among the most private, 
intimate decisions that an individual can make, marriage necessarily involves a public 
component that the decisions to utilize contraceptives or to engage in sexual intimacy lack. As 
one scholar has explained, “[C]ivil marriage (at least the way we have traditionally understood it 
in this country) cannot exist in the absence of state recognition. It is State action that creates the 
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very institution that makes the exercise of the fundamental right to liberty in the context of 
marriage possible.”172 This fundamental difference brings the same-sex marriage debate out of 
the strictly private arena of autonomous choices, which were the focus of these prior precedents 
dealing with the right to privacy.173 Instead of merely asking if individuals have a right to make 
personal decisions in private without state interference, one must ask if the state should 
publically be required to permit or recognize same-sex marriages.  
With that difference in mind, the most problematic language in Lawrence for opponents 
of same-sex marriage appears in the Court’s discussion of Casey, wherein the Court found that 
“personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child 
rearing, and education” are “afford[ed] constitutional protection.”174 While proponents of same-
sex marriage take this reference to marriage as a sign that same-sex marriage is also protected 
under the right of privacy, Part I’s discussion of Loving dispelled the notion that same-sex 
marriage is included within the fundamental right of marriage.175 Hence, this language in 
Lawrence is not as helpful to same-sex marriage proponents as it would first seem.  
Further, the Lawrence Court concluded by expressly clarifying what the case did not 
concern.176 It was not a case involving minors, coercion, public conduct, prostitution, or the 
recognition of a relationship by the state.177 Instead, the Court noted that it was simply a case 
involving adults who desired to engage in private, consensual conduct without fear of 
government intrusion or punishment.178 The Court held that people are “entitled to respect for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Ball, supra note 145, at 1206 (footnote omitted). 
173 See supra text accompanying notes 166-171. 
174 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-74 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 
(1992)). 
175 See supra Part I. 
176 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
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their private lives” and that the state may not “demean their existence or control their destiny by 
making their private sexual conduct a crime.”179  
Hence, Lawrence was ultimately founded on the Court’s view of the impermissibility of 
the state invading the privacy of one’s bedroom and criminalizing intimate conduct involving 
consenting adults. 180  In contrast, marriage involves the state’s public recognition of a 
relationship.181 Therefore, since the Lawrence Court was concerned about privacy, while the 
permission or recognition of same-sex marriage involves a public action by the state, Lawrence’s 
language and the implications drawn from that language do not require states to permit or 
recognize same-sex marriages. 
III.  FEDERALISM, DIGNITY, AND ANIMUS: WHAT DID WINDSOR ACTUALLY IMPLY? 
Likewise, United States v. Windsor does not compel the conclusion that states must 
permit or recognize same-sex marriage. The federalism implications of the federal government’s 
attempt to define marriage in the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) have no bearing on the 
authority of states individually to continue to define marriage.182 Further, although the federal 
government through DOMA may have interfered with the equal dignity that a particular state had 
conferred on a same-sex marriage,183 it would work an identical affront to force a state to permit 
and recognize a relationship in conformity with the broadest definition of marriage. 184 
Additionally, states with such laws are not acting out of animus in holding to a traditional 
definition of marriage.185 Therefore, Windsor does not compel states to permit or recognize 
same-sex marriage.  	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A. Overview of Windsor  
Before delving into the federalism issues in Windsor, it is first important to understand 
the statute at issue. Section 3 of DOMA supplied federal definitions for marriage and spouse.186 
It defined marriage as “‘only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and 
wife.’”187 Correspondingly, it defined spouse as “‘only . . . a person of the opposite sex who is a 
husband or a wife.’”188 The reach of this statute was extremely broad, “control[ling] over 1,000 
federal laws in which marital or spousal status is addressed as a matter of federal law.”189 
1. Federalism 
In determining that this federal statute was unconstitutional, the Court examined 
DOMA’s “design, purpose, and effect,” as well as the history and tradition of states regulating 
marriage. 190  The Court observed that DOMA was an example of Congress “mak[ing] 
determinations that bear on marital rights and privileges.” While this has generally been an 
acceptable exercise of congressional power, the Court affirmed that, based on history and 
tradition, the individual states have retained the authority to define and regulate marriage as long 
as they respect the constitutional rights of individuals.191 The Court recognized that “[t]he 
definition of marriage is the foundation of the State’s broader authority to regulate the subject of 
domestic relations.”192 Because this power was reserved to the states, marriage laws often differ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013). 
187 Id. (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) (invalidated 2013)). 
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between the states.193 For instance, states have different requirements for the minimum age to 
marry and the degree of consanguinity.194 In exercising this authority, several states, like New 
York, have chosen to recognize and permit same-sex marriages.195  
The Court was highly concerned about DOMA’s impact on these same-sex marriages, 
especially considering that the Constitution affords the federal government no authority over 
marriage.196 Because of this lack of authority, the federal government has historically deferred to 
states on the subject of domestic relations.197 The obvious problem with DOMA, then, was that it 
ran counter to the strong history and tradition of states defining marriage.198 In contrast, due to 
the strong tradition of states defining marriage,199 Windsor actually seems to support the 
authority of states to have different definitions of marriage—some allowing same-sex marriage 
and some prohibiting it. However, the Court did not stop here in its discussion of DOMA’s 
unconstitutionality.200  
2. Dignity and Animus 
The Court next turned to what it perceived as an even more apparent problem with 
DOMA—the fact that states had conferred a dignity on same-sex marriages that the federal 
government refused to recognize. 201  The Court explained that when states exercise their 
historical authority to define marriage, they confer dignity on those marriages.202 However, 	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“DOMA, because of its reach and extent, departs from this history and tradition of reliance on 
state law to define marriage.”203 Since this is an unusual form of discrimination, the Court noted 
that it is important to carefully consider whether Section 3 of DOMA violates the Constitution.204 
Within this consideration, the Court examined whether this injury deprives people of liberty that 
the Fifth Amendment protects.205  
First, the Court observed that New York acted within its authority when it recognized 
same-sex marriages in response to “the formation of consensus respecting the way the members 
of a discrete community treat each other in their daily contact and constant interaction with each 
other.”206 The Court recognized that states have an “interest in defining and regulating the 
marital relation, subject to constitutional guarantees, [which] stems from the understanding the 
marriage is more than a routine classification for purposes of certain statutory benefits.”207 As 
such, when New York recognized and permitted same-sex marriages, it provided “legal 
acknowledgement of the intimate relationship between two people,” showing the community’s 
new understanding of equality.208 
With this in mind, the Court determined that DOMA violated the Fifth Amendment’s 
due-process and equal-protection requirements.209 The Court explained that the government 
cannot treat a group disparately based only on a “‘bare congressional desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group.’”210 Further, the Court saw DOMA’s unusual departure from the tradition of 
allowing states to define marriage as “strong evidence” that DOMA was “motivated by an 	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204 Id. (“‘“[D]iscrimiantions of an unusual character especially suggest careful consideration to determine whether 
they are obnoxious to the constitution.”’” (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (quoting Louisville 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37-38 (1928)))).  
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improper animus or purpose.”211 Hence, the Court determined that a more careful review of 
DOMA was required in order to ensure that the law was not motivated by animus.212  
Applying this close review, the Court examined DOMA’s history and text.213 The Court 
concluded that DOMA’s “essence,” not merely its “incidental effect,” was to “interefere[] with 
the equal dignity of same-sex marriages, a dignity conferred by the States in the exercise of their 
sovereign power.”214 The Court condemned DOMA as treating same-sex marriages, which states 
have chosen to recognize, as “second-class marriages for purposes of federal law.”215 
Further, the Court concluded that DOMA’s effect was to “write inequality into the entire 
United States Code.”216 In the Court’s view, DOMA made a “subset of state-sanctioned 
marriages” unequal, which “diminished the stability and predictability of basic personal relations 
the State ha[d] found it proper to acknowledge and protect.”217 Additionally, the Court argued 
that DOMA “tells [same-sex] couples, and all the world, that their otherwise valid marriages are 
unworthy of federal recognition.”218 This inequality “demeans the couple . . . and humiliates 
[their] children.”219 Hence, for this and a variety of other reasons on which the Court elaborated 
in Windsor, DOMA burdened the lives of same-sex couples.220  
From all of this, the Windsor Court found that DOMA’s “principle purpose and necessary 
effect . . . are to demean those persons who are in lawful same-sex marriage.”221 Hence, DOMA 
violated the Fifth Amendment by unconstitutionally depriving people of their liberty and denying 
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them equal protection.222 Since the Court could not find a legitimate purpose to overcome this 
apparent unconstitutional purpose, the Court declared DOMA’s federal definitions of marriage 
and spouse unconstitutional.223 
B. Implications of Windsor for Recognition/Permission of Same-Sex Marriage by States 
Although the Windsor Court specifically stated that its holding was confined to same-sex 
marriages explicitly recognized under state law,224 many have argued that Windsor itself compels 
the conclusion that states must permit, or at least must recognize, same-sex marriages.225 While 
the language about “animus” and “dignity” may lend some support to such a conclusion,226 the 
focus on the traditional role of states in defining marriage militates toward the contrary result.227   
Some courts have utilized Windsor to determine that states must recognize same-sex 
marriages established by other states.228 In particular, “[b]y the summer of 2014, thirteen federal 
district courts . . . had struck down state laws or constitutional amendments that prohibited same-
sex marriages.”229 Also, in 2014, the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits reached similar 
conclusions.230 In reaching this result, the Seventh Circuit was influenced by the Windsor 
Court’s discussion of how a state’s refusal to recognize same-sex marriage would harm the 
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children of the couple who could not marry.231 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit cited Windsor in 
concluding that heightened scrutiny applies to “classifications based on sexual orientation.”232  
Admitting the tension between opposing positions about Windsor’s implications, one 
scholar, Murray Dry, posited that if Windsor is mainly about federalism, states should retain their 
authority to refuse same-sex marriage.233 However, if Windsor is about a substantive due-process 
right of dignity, then it is much more difficult for states to justify a refusal to permit or recognize 
same-sex marriages.234 He points out that, on the one hand, the Windsor Court did not mention 
Section 2 of DOMA, “which guarantees each state the right to determine its own marriage laws 
regardless of what other states do.”235 However, on the other hand, Windsor contains strong 
language about the dignity that a state confers upon a same-sex marriage and the harm that the 
federal government inflicts by refusing to recognize that marriage.236 Dry noted that this concept 
could be extended to prevent states from “deny[ing] this ‘fundamental right’ to same-sex 
couples, including those who were married in another jurisdiction . . . as well as those who wish 
to marry in their own state.”237 Therefore, he concludes that it is difficult to determine how the 
Court will rule on whether states must permit and recognize same-sex marriage.238  
However, some courts have concluded that Windsor does not compel states to permit or 
recognize same-sex marriage. For instance, the Sixth Circuit noted that, although the Windsor 
Court avoided one federal question, it acknowledged federalism issues when discussing 
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“individual dignity.”239 Rather, the Court started by noting that, since the federal government 
was acting contrary to the tradition of state authority to define and regulate marriage, this 
“raise[d] suspicion that bigotry rather than legitimate policy [was] afoot.”240 It explained that 
Congress lacked the “power to enact ‘unusual’ legislation that interfered with the States’ long-
held authority to define marriage.”241 In stark contrast, when states define marriage in the 
traditional way and choose not to recognize same-sex marriages, they are “doing exactly what 
every State has been doing for hundreds of years: defining marriage as they see it.”242 For 
example, as the Windsor Court explicitly noted, “New York ‘without doubt’ had the power under 
its traditional authority over marriage to extend the definition of marriage to include gay 
couples.”243 Likewise, as the Sixth Circuit concluded, the states’ “undoubted power” to define 
marriage illustrates that states should be afforded great deference when they choose to maintain 
traditional marriage definitions.244   
As discussed in Windsor, states have a clear and deeply rooted tradition of defining 
marriage without interference from the federal government.245 Because of the concerns about 
dignity, some argue that, by refusing to recognize same-sex marriages, states similarly violate the 
Constitution by interfering with the dignity of those marriages.246 However, if that were the case, 
each state would forced as a constitutional matter to adopt or recognize the definition of marriage 
from the state with the broadest definition. Otherwise, states would be in danger of creating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239 DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 413-14 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, No. 14-571, 2015 WL 213650 (U.S. 
2015) (“[P]laintiffs mistake Windsor’s avoidance of one federalism question for avoidance of federalism 
altogether.”). 
240 Id. at 414. 
241 Id. (quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692-93). 
242 Id. 
243 Id. (quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692-93). 
244 See id. at 416. 
245 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689-90, 2695 (“By history and tradition the definition and regulation of marriage . . . has 
been treated as being within the authority and realm of the separate States.”). 
246 See Dry, supra note 59, at 332. 
	   	  32 
“second-tier” marriages or violating the “dignity” that other states had conferred on those 
marriages.247 In the end, there would be a nationally applied standard of marriage implemented 
by those states with the broadest definitions of marriage. That result seems deeply antithetical to 
the acknowledged tradition of states individually defining marriage that the Windsor Court found 
so important to protect.248 Therefore, the reasons that compelled the federal government to 
recognize a same-sex marriage conferred by a state do not compel a state to recognize a same-
sex marriage from a sister state.  
Furthermore, would not forcing states to recognize same-sex marriages be an equal 
affront to the dignity of marriage as those states choose to define it? As the Court in Windsor 
noted, 
[U]ntil recent years . . . marriage between a man and a woman no doubt had been thought of by 
most people as essential to the very definition of that term and to its role and function throughout 
the history of civilization. That belief, for many who long have held it, became even more urgent, 
more cherished when challenged.249  
The Court further pointed out that New York had “a statewide deliberative process” in which its 
citizens could evaluate same-sex marriage before “enlarg[ing] the definition of marriage.”250 If 
New York could utilize its democratic process in making a vast change to the way the venerable 
institution of marriage is defined,251 then why should other states be deprived of this opportunity 
by having this new definition foisted on them through a constitutional mandate to recognize 
those marriages from other states? That itself seems like an affront to the important tradition of 
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states defining marriage and the dignity that those states choose to confer on marriage within 
their own borders.252  
 Therefore, Windsor does not require states to permit or recognize same-sex marriage. 
Windsor was largely focused on the tradition of states defining and regulating marriage and the 
federal government’s contravention of its bounds in an unusual way, evidencing the possible 
animus behind the law.253 In contrast, when states adhere to their own definitions of marriage, 
they are simply acting under their traditional authority.254 Since there is nothing unusual about 
states having different requirements for marriage, the evidence of animus meriting closer review 
is lacking. Instead, as will be discussed in Part IV, states should be granted a high degree of 
deference in their regulation of marriage when under rational-basis review.255  
IV. SURVIVING RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW: UPHOLDING TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE 
Just as the precedent from opinions like Loving, Lawrence, and Windsor does not require 
states to permit or recognize same-sex marriage, states can also survive rational-basis review by 
holding to a traditional definition of marriage. This Part first explains what rational-basis review 
entails.256 It then applies rational-basis review to laws that refuse to permit and recognize same-
sex marriage.257 Additionally, this Part provides examples of legitimate government interests to 
which marriage laws are rationally related.258 Finally, it concludes that, since these marriage laws 
can survive rational-basis review, states can constitutionally limit marriage to between one man 
and one woman.259 
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A. Rational Basis Review Explained 
 Before examining whether state laws that refuse to permit or recognize same-sex 
marriage are unconstitutional, it is vital to determine the appropriate standard of review. Unless a 
form of heightened scrutiny applies—because the right at issue is fundamental right or the 
restriction discriminates against a suspect or quasi-suspect class—laws challenged as violative of 
equal protection or due process must only survive rational-basis review.260 As argued in Part I’s 
discussion of Loving, the right to same-sex marriage is not fundamental.261 Further, the Supreme 
Court has never recognized sexual orientation as a suspect or quasi-suspect class.262 Therefore, 
based on current Supreme Court precedent, neither strict scrutiny263 nor intermediate scrutiny264 
would apply in this context. 
Hence, these laws should be reviewed under the rational-basis standard. That is, the law 
need only be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.265 If there is “any plausible 
reason” for the law, “even one that did not motivate the legislators who enacted it,” then “the law 
must stand, no matter how unfair, unjust, or unwise the judges may consider it as citizens.”266 
Under this standard, the law need not even be the best way to accomplish an objective.267 As one 
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scholar has put it, “a law can be constitutional even if it could be improved.”268 Further, the law 
can be over-inclusive or under-inclusive.269 Moreover, the law is presumed constitutional, and 
those challenging the law have the burden of proving its unconstitutionality.270  
B. Rational Basis Review Applied 
Applying rational-basis review, some courts have concluded that state laws adhering to 
the traditional definition of marriage are unconstitutional.271 However, the Sixth Circuit recently 
reached the contrary conclusion.272 While there are valid arguments on both sides of the issue, 
overall, states do have legitimate interests to which their traditional-marriage laws are rationally 
related. Therefore, state laws prohibiting 273 and not recognizing 274  same-sex marriage are 
constitutional.  
1. Prohibiting Solemnization of Same-Sex Marriages Within the State 
Before considering legitimate government interests that are rationally related to a state 
law prohibiting same-sex marriages, this subsection begins by clearing up the three important 
issues. First, as discussed in regard to Loving in Part I, it is vital to remember that race-based and 
same-sex-based limitations on marriage are not identical.275 Second, laws are typically given 
broad deference under rational-basis review, and there is no reason to deviate from that formula 
in this context.276 Third, states did not enact these laws out of animus, as the Windsor Court 
accused the federal government of doing with DOMA.277 With these points in mind, this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268 Id. at 338. 
269 DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 405 (“The significant feature of rational basis review is that governments will not be placed 
in the dock for doing too much or for doing too little in addressing a policy question.”). 
270 See Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 671 (7th Cir. 2014). 
271 See, e.g., id. at 654. 
272 DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 404-08. 
273 See infra Subsection IV.B.1. 
274 See infra Subsection IV.B.2. 
275 See infra text accompanying notes 280-282. 
276 See infra text accompanying notes 283-287. 
277 See infra text accompanying notes 288-294. 
	   	  36 
subsection presents examples of legitimate government interests that are rationally related to 
state laws refusing to permit or recognize same-sex marriage. 278  Finally, this subsection 
concludes by determining that these legitimate interests are sufficient to ensure the survival of 
the laws under rational-basis review, even though they may be over-inclusive and under-
inclusive.279  
First, as previously discussed with Loving in Part I, some have argued that if a state is not 
authorized to prohibit marriages between individuals of different races, a state similarly is not 
authorized to prohibit marriages between individuals of the same sex.280 However, as one scholar 
noted,  
In the context of marriage, sex is different from race because the natural difference between male 
and female is essential to procreation, and procreation allows for children to be raised by their 
biological parents. Some people regard this as the optimal condition for childrearing. Short of the 
optimal condition, those same people think it is best for children to have a father and a mother, 
rather than two fathers or two mothers.281  
Hence, while the state lacks a legitimate interest in prohibiting marriage between individuals of 
different races, the state retains a legitimate interest in limiting marriage to individuals of 
opposite sex.282 
Second, as the Sixth Circuit observed, the Supreme Court typically affords wide 
deference to states and rarely strikes state laws when applying rational-basis review.283 However, 
in cases where the Court has struck laws under rational-basis review, it has typically done so 
because the law was novel and targeted “a single group for disfavored treatment.”284 The Sixth 
Circuit argued that, instead of being novel, state laws adhering to a traditional view of marriage 
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were just that—traditional.285 They “codified a long-existing, widely held social norm already 
reflected in state law.”286 As even the Windsor Court recognized, “‘marriage between a man and 
a woman . . . had been thought of by most people as essential to the very definition of that term 
and to its role and function throughout the history of civilization.’”287 Therefore, states should 
retain this broad deference in the context of defining marriage. 
Third, the Sixth Circuit argued that states did not enact such marriage laws out of 
animus.288 Rather, the laws were enacted out of “fear that the courts would seize control over an 
issue that people of good faith care deeply about.”289 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit noted the 
impossibility of ferreting out the motives of legislators and, even more so, of voters in statewide 
initiatives.290 The court queried, “How in this setting can we indict the 2.7 million Michigan 
voters who supported the amendment in 2004, less than one year after the first state supreme 
court recognized a constitutional right to gay marriage, for favoring the amendment for 
prejudicial reasons and for prejudicial reasons alone?”291 In reply, the court argued that “[a]ny 
such conclusion cannot be squared with the benefit of the doubt customarily give voters and 
legislatures under rational basis review.”292 Furthermore, “[i]t is no less unfair to paint the 
proponents of the measures as a monolithic group of hate-mongers than it is to paint the 
opponents as a monolithic group trying to undo American families.” 293  Since the court 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
285 Id. 
286 Id. 
287 Id. (quoting United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013)). 
288 Id. 
289 Id. The Sixth Circuit went on to say that those fears were just, as by that time “several state courts had [already] 
altered their States’ traditional definitions of marriage under the States’ constitutions.” Id. 
290 Id. at 409. 
291 Id. 
292 Id. 
293 Id. at 410. 
	   	  38 
determined that a variety of explanations other than animus exist for the laws adhering to 
traditional marriage, it found the laws constitutional.294 
There are several legitimate interests that states have for prohibiting same-sex marriage. 
For example, states may want to “wait and see” the impact of same-sex marriage “before 
changing a norm that our society (like all others) has accepted for centuries.”295 Considering that 
the first state to legalize same-sex marriage did so as late as 2003, a mere twelve years may not 
suffice to determine whether the impact will be positive or negative.296 Therefore, states can 
rationally decide that they need more data regarding the impact of same-sex marriage before they 
effect such a pronounced change on marriage.  
Another legitimate interest that a state would have for adhering to a traditional definition 
of marriage is encouraging stable relationships for unplanned children. The Sixth Circuit 
accepted the explanation that the government regulates and incentivizes marriage in part for the 
purpose of encouraging “stable relationships within which children may flourish.”297 As the 
Sixth Circuit argued, incentivizing marriage between opposite-sex couples, but not doing so for 
same-sex couples, “does not convict the States of irrationality, only of awareness of the 
biological reality that couples of the same sex do not have children in the same way as couples of 
opposite sexes and that couples of the same sex do not run the risk of unintended offspring.”298 
The Indiana Court of Appeals relied on this same reasoning, explaining that the question is 
“whether allowing same-sex marriage would further the States’ interest in encouraging 
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‘responsible procreation’ by opposite-sex couples, not . . . whether that interest would be 
harmed” by permitting same-sex marriages.299  
However, some people object that laws adhering to a traditional definition of marriage 
are both too under-inclusive and too over-inclusive.300 Yet, the most important point to consider 
is that under-inclusion and over-inclusion are completely acceptable under rational-basis 
review.301 As the Sixth Circuit explained, “The signature feature of rational basis review is that 
governments will not be placed in the dock for doing too much or for doing too little in 
addressing a policy question.”302 In other words, the court cannot strike a law simply because 
there is now a better way to accomplish a certain goal.303  
On the one hand, people claim that traditional-marriage laws are too under-inclusive if 
the legitimate interest is creating stable families for children.304 They argue that same-sex 
couples can also have children through adoption or reproduction.305 If married parents generally 
provide a better environment for children, as most people would agree, then why would that be 
different with same-sex parents?306 Even though same-sex couples do raise children and have 
children through adoption or assisted reproductive technology, these children are, necessarily, 
planned. 307  In contrast, the focus under this legitimate state interest is creating a stable 
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environment for unintended children.308 Therefore, states can rationally differentiate between 
same-sex and opposite-sex couples based on their “ability to procreate ‘naturally.’”309 
Even if the goal of marriage were broadly defined as creating stable families for all 
children, whether planned or unplanned, it must be understood that a law can be under-
inclusive.310 Although permitting and encouraging marriage between same-sex couples would 
also further that goal, states need not do everything possible to further their goals.311 Rather, they 
have the discretion to choose a rational way to accomplish their goals.312 Therefore, under 
rational-basis review, it would still be acceptable for a state to choose only to permit and 
encourage marriages between opposite-sex couples. 
On the other hand, proponents of same-sex marriage have argued that traditional-
marriage laws are over-inclusive.313 They often point out that states do not require people to 
prove their intent or ability to have children as a precondition of marriage.314 If this is not 
required, they argue, then same-sex couples should also be allowed to marry.315 However, the 
Supreme Court has upheld similar line-drawing under rational basis review in the past.316 For 
instance, the Court found that a mandatory retirement age of fifty for law-enforcement officers 
was acceptable as a proxy for physical fitness, even though it was both under-inclusive and over-
inclusive.317 As the Sixth Circuit asked, “If a rough correlation between age and strength suffices 
to uphold exception-free retirement ages (even though some fifty-year olds swim/bike/run 
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triathlons), why doesn’t a correlation between male-female intercourse and procreation suffice to 
uphold traditional marriage laws (even though some straight couples don’t have kids and may 
gay couples do)?”318 
Moreover, this rough correlation is an non-invasive way for states to approximate whom 
to permit and encourage to marry. Consider a system where a state required all couples to 
undergo testing to determine their capability of procreation as a precondition of marriage. Would 
not most people object to such a law, and rightfully so, as being highly invasive of personal 
privacy? Consider also a law that required couples to sign an affidavit affirming that they plan to 
have children after they marry. Would not most people similarly object that their post-marital 
intent to have children is not the state’s business? While the state may be interested in creating a 
stable environment for children, it could not justify such invasive laws before permitting people 
to marry. However, with same-sex couples, there is no need to establish the ability of the couple 
to have children. Hence, the possibility of unplanned children being raised in an unstable 
environment does not exist with a same-sex couple in the way that it does for the vast majority of 
opposite-sex couples. Therefore, even though laws adhering to a traditional definition of 
marriage are both under-inclusive and over-inclusive, they are still rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest.  Accordingly, they survive rational-basis review.  
2. Not Recognizing Same-Sex Marriages Solemnized in Other States 
Specifically addressing the obligation of a state to recognize a same-sex marriage 
solemnized in another state, the Sixth Circuit concluded that if a state is not required to permit 
solemnization of same-sex marriage within the state, it need not recognize a same-sex marriage 
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solemnized in another state.319 The court argued that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not 
require State A to recognize a judgment entered in State B’s if that judgment violates States A’s 
legitimate public policy.320 Therefore, if State A may legitimately refuse to solemnize a same-sex 
marriage, it is constitutionally acceptable for State A to refuse to recognize a same-sex marriage 
solemnized in another state on the basis that recognition of such a marriage would violate State 
A’s public policy.321  
Because of the Windsor Court’s discussion of dignity conferred by a state to a same-sex 
marriage, some may argue that recognition of marriages from other states is nonetheless 
constitutionally required under the Due Process Clause.322 However, Section III.B already 
illustrated the weaknesses of this argument.323 Further, the Sixth Circuit noted that, under 
rational-basis review, states do have a legitimate interest in defining marriage within their own 
borders.324 Adhering to the state’s own definition of marriage in determining which out-of-state 
marriages to recognize prevents individuals from circumventing the state’s legitimate marriage 
law by marrying in another state and then returning.325 Therefore, if a state law permitting 
solemnization only of traditional marriages survives rational-basis review, its policy of only 
recognizing traditional marriages solemnized in other states survives as well.326  
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CONCLUSION 
The United States Supreme Court is poised to resolve the issues of whether states can 
limit marriage to between one man and one woman, and whether states must recognize same-sex 
marriages validly created in other states.327 This Note has shown that the Supreme Court’s 
precedents do not necessarily compel the conclusion that states must permit the solemnization of 
same-sex marriages. Further, they do not compel the conclusion that states must recognize such 
marriages that have been validly created in other states.  
Rather, as Part I illustrated, the Court can easily distinguish Loving’s discussion of 
marriage as a fundamental right by concluding that same-sex marriage does not fall within the 
concept of marriage that is rooted in history and tradition.328 Further, as Part II showed, the 
Court’s decision in Lawrence was founded on the impermissibility of the state invading the 
private, intimate choices of consenting adults.329 In contrast, marriage is a public action in which 
the state is necessarily involved.330 Moreover, as Part III demonstrated, Windsor was focused on 
the animus demonstrated by the federal government in taking the unusual step of interfering with 
the definition of marriage, which by tradition is a matter of state authority.331 Therefore, when 
states choose not to permit or recognize same-sex marriages from other states, they are merely 
acting pursuant to that tradition.332  
Finally, within that tradition, states’ traditional definitions of marriage are rationally 
related to legitimate government interests of both waiting to see the impact of same-sex marriage 
and encouraging stability in family relationships for unintended children.333 Therefore, state laws 	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limiting marriage to between one man and one woman survive rational-basis review and are 
constitutional.334 Although Justice Scalia is waiting for the other shoe to drop, that day may 
never come.335  
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